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Abstract The paper deals with Wittgenstein’s treatment of radical skepticism. He
holds from his earliest work to his last that skepticism is senseless and therefore no
rebuttal, such as G.E. Moore offered, is necessary.
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Since the time of the Greeks, radical scepticism in various forms has been regarded
as a main threat by those who are proponents of certainty, as Wittgenstein was in On
Certainty. From antiquity to the present, the attempts to neutralize such threats have
been largely regarded as unsuccessful. But the writings of Wittgenstein mark a new
development in defusing this deflationary posture. Unlike most philosophers who
have assumed that scepticism represents a coherent position that demands a
responsible rebuttal, Wittgenstein emphasized that it was senseless, and required
no formal refutation, especially of the sort that Moore tried to give in “Proof of an
External World.” In 6.51 of the Tractatus, his earliest publication, he uses the word
“unsinn” to describe radical scepticism, and in entry 3.83 in On Certainty, his last
notebook, he describes it as “sinnlos.” However, the reasoning in support of his
dismissal of scepticism differs over time, a topic that because of its complexity, I
shall by-pass in this essay.1 For the exegete, however, there are two matters that are
worth immediate expatiation. The first is that Wittgenstein frequently fails to specify
what form of scepticism he is considering. This is true of both the Tractatus and On
Certainty. In the former work, he writes:
Scepticism is not irrefutable but palpably senseless, if it would doubt where a
question cannot be asked.
For doubt can only exist where there is a question; a question only where there
is an answer, and this only where something can be said. (6.51)
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This citation not only refers to scepticism without mentioning any precise or
definite form of that attitude, but it also rests on the famous showing and saying
distinction. At TLP 4.1212, he writes: “What can be shown cannot be said.” For the
early Wittgenstein, the only things that can be said are the propositions of natural
science (TLP 6.53). A limited number of things can only be shown: solipsism, a
thinking, willing self, and the philosophical I, among them. Although he does not
directly state this, the implication of these remarks is, presumably, that if something
can be said, it cannot be shown.
We find the same lack of specificity in some of the key entries in On Certainty:
It would be as if someone were looking for some object in a room; he opens a
drawer and doesn’t see it there; then he closes it, waits, and opens it once more to
see if perhaps it isn’t there now, and keeps on like that. He has not learned to look
for things….He has not learned the game that we are trying to teach him. (OC 315)
In this passage, the contrast Wittgenstein is working with is between doubts, that
in principle can be settled, and those which cannot. Some commentators have also
designated this contrast as being between “philosophical” and “everyday” doubt, a
distinction that is indeed found in On Certainty2.
The situation is completely different with respect to the second matter I
mentioned earlier. Without abandoning the idea that radical scepticism is senseless,
Wittgenstein shifted gears and in his later writings — those that Danièle Moyal-
Sharrock has called “the Third Wittgenstein,” meaning by that term all of the
writings he composed after Part I of the Investigations — he began to discuss the
Dream Hypothesis of Descartes, that is, a specific form of scepticism. We can thus
distinguish between his treatments of an unspecified and quite general form of
scepticism and something more specific, namely, the Dream Hypothesis.
In order to see how Wittgenstein deals with Cartesian doubt, it will be useful to
present a segment containing that argument. Here is the segment, taken from
Meditation I:
Though this be true, I must nevertheless here consider that I am a man, and
that, consequently, I am in the habit of sleeping, and representing to myself in
dreams those same things, or even sometimes others less probable, which the
insane think are presented to them in their waking moments. How often have I
dreamt that I was in these familiar circumstances, that I was dressed, and
occupied this place by the fire, when I was lying undressed in bed? At the
present moment, however, I certainly look upon this paper with eyes wide
awake; the head which I now move is not asleep; I extend this hand
consciously and with express purpose, and I perceive it; the occurrences in
sleep are not so distinct as all this. But I cannot forget that, at other times I
have been deceived in sleep by similar illusions; and, attentively considering
those cases, I perceive so clearly that there exist no certain marks by which the
state of waking can ever be distinguished from sleep, that I feel greatly
astonished; and in amazement I almost persuade myself that I am now
2 For examples, see Wittgenstein and Moore on Certainty, 111, 116–117, 134–136, 140, and 179–180.
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dreaming. Let us suppose, then, that we are dreaming, and that all these
particulars — namely, the opening of the eyes, the motion of the head, the
forth- putting of the hands — are merely illusions; and even that we really
possess neither an entire body nor hands. (Descartes 1955, 90–91)
It will be noted that the key to the argument lies in the supposition that dream and
waking states cannot be distinguished. As Descartes says in the preceding passage:
“there exist no certain marks by which the state of waking can ever be distinguished
from sleep.” Some philosophers have challenged this assumption, arguing that
dream states lack the kind of coherence that normal waking experience exhibits. But
this is not the thrust of Wittgenstein’s objection. It is rather that he regards the
statement that “I may be dreaming,” if taken literally, as Descartes does, to be a form
of nonsense. We shall see later why this is a deeper objection than anything anyone
else had previously suggested.
It is interesting to speculate on why Wittgenstein turned from the generalized
form of scepticism which we find in TLP and in numerous places in OC to the
Dream Hypothesis. My own suggestion is that he regarded it as the deepest and most
powerful version of radical scepticism. But this construal, of course, is a matter of
sheer speculation since there is nothing in any of the Third Wittgenstein texts that
gives us reliable information about his actual motivation.
Still, the question is worth thinking about, since the last entry (676) in OC deals
with that argument. Obviously he deemed the Dream conjecture to represent a
serious challenge to his advocacy of certitude. The entry was inserted into the
manuscript only 2 days before he died in 1951. It reads as follows:
“But even if in such cases, I can’t be mistaken, isn’t it possible that I am
drugged?” If I am and if the drug has taken away my consciousness, then I am
not now really talking and thinking. I cannot seriously suppose that I am at this
moment dreaming. Someone who, dreaming says: “I am dreaming,” even if he
speaks audibly in doing so, is no more right than if he said in his dream “it is
raining,” while it was in fact raining. Even if his dream were actually
connected with the noise of the rain. (OC 676)
It will be noted that the first sentence is in quotes. We can therefore attribute the
question to an unnamed interlocutor (usually a traditional philosopher). The interlocutor
is raising an objection thatWittgenstein will address in the rest of the citation. In order to
understand the interlocutor’s cavil, we have to look at the paragraph that immediately
precedes OC 676. Wittgenstein is now speaking:
If someone believes that he has flown from America to England in the last few
days, then I believe, he cannot be making a mistake.
And just the same if someone says that he is at this moment sitting at a table
and writing. (OC 675).
It is clear that Wittgenstein thinks that the interlocutor fails to distinguish mistakes
from mental disturbances.3 In the penultimate passage just quoted, and in entries 194
3 See my discussion of the difference between these concepts in Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty,
ed. by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and William H. Brenner (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007), 36–41.
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and 195 of OC, Wittgenstein is drawing just such a distinction. It is the difference
that he sometimes characterizes as being between a Fehler or Irrtum, and a
Geistestgestörtheit. Occasionally, instead of “Geistestgestört” he uses the term
“verrückt” There are other places in that notebook where a similar contrast is being
drawn:
If someone supposed that all our calculations were uncertain and that we could
rely on none of them (justifying himself by saying that mistakes (Fehler) are
always possible) perhaps we would say he was crazy (verrückt) But can we say
he is in error? (er sei in Irrtum?) (OC 217)
In the three places in the writings of the Third Wittgenstein that treat the Dream
Hypothesis, (Zettel, 396, OC 383, and 676) there are no explicit arguments showing
that the conception is senseless, but there are remarks that can be construed as
submerged arguments to this effect. Let us look seriatim at these entries to see if we
can explicate his reasoning. In OC 676 the interlocutor is suggesting that it is
possible that one might be drugged, and in that case one may well be mistaken about
whether or when he has traveled. A guiding presupposition underlying the
interlocutor’s objection is that the effect of drugging could render a person unable
to know where he is or what is happening to him. Wittgenstein interprets the
assumption more strongly than the interlocutor intends, that is, as implying that the
drugged person is unconscious. His response is to insist that one who is unconscious
is “not really talking and thinking.” His point is that a person who is not talking and
thinking is not making a sensible assertion. This idea rests on a familiar thesis in all
of Wittgenstein’s later writings, namely, that certain background and contextual
conditions have to be satisfied if an utterance is to count as a statement. And one of
these conditions is that the person must be awake if his utterances are to be
significant. The condition is obviously unfilled if the person is asleep and dreaming.
Wittgenstein’s way of formulating this condition is to say that a sleeping person is
neither talking nor thinking.
An exegete might be puzzled by Wittgenstein’s idea that a person who utters a
well-formed sentence while unconscious or dreaming is not really talking. It is more
plausible to hold that an utterance made while a person who is asleep or unconscious
is not thinking. But in OC 350 Wittgenstein explains what he means by saying that a
person who is dreaming or unconscious is not really talking. In this passage, he may
well be conflating talking (in the sense of uttering certain words) with significant
speech. But in either case it is only when the context is appropriate that a particular
remark, even if well formed grammatically, will count as significant. He gives an
example in that entry of someone who blurts out a comment that is grammatically in
order, and where, Wittgenstein says, we do not even know what language the person
is speaking. I will not quote all of the lengthy passage, but at least enough of it to
illustrate why he says the speaker is not talking. Its relevance to the Dream
Hypothesis is immediate:
Similarly, someone who was entertaining the idea that he was no use any more
might keep repeating to himself “I can still do this and this and this.” If such
thoughts often possessed him one would not be surprised if he, apparently out
of all context, spoke such a sentence out loud. (But here I have already
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sketched a background, a surrounding, for this remark, that is to say given it a
context). But if someone in quite heterogeneous circumstances, called out with
the most convincing mimicry: “Down with him!,” one might say of these
words (and their tone) that they were a pattern that does indeed have familiar
applications, but that in this case it was not even clear what language the man
in question was speaking. I might make with my hand the movement I should
make if I were holding a hand-saw and sawing through a plank; but would one
have any right to call this movement sawing, out of all context?—(It might be
something quite different!). (OC 350)
The embedded argument we find here is that the same words said in certain
circumstances constitute a recognizable speech act, but said in others do not. As he
says: “one might say of these words that they were a pattern that does indeed have
familiar applications.” For example, the words “I may be dreaming,” uttered by
someone who is awake, may have a sensible use in certain circumstances. Suppose
that a person has just inherited a fortune from a recently deceased relative with
whom the recipient was relatively unacquainted. The heir might use those words to
express his astonishment at having received such an unexpected gift. That he has
used those words to say something significant entails, for Wittgenstein, that he was
awake when he uttered them. Wittgenstein in effect is asking: are there any
circumstance in which he could use the words literally to mean that at the moment of
speaking he might be asleep and dreaming? The answer for him is obviously “no.”
This is what he is emphasizing when he states in OC 676 that someone who,
dreaming, is no more right than if he said in his dream “It is raining while it was in
fact raining.” The submerged argument in this entry when made explicit is that if
someone did mean them in that way his utterance would be self-defeating, for it
would entail that he was awake at the time he spoke. This is thus a case in which the
necessary contextual circumstances for significance would have been absent, and
nothing sensible (sinnvoll) would have been said. In such a case, Wittgenstein says,
one would not be talking and certainly would not be thinking. We find a similar
pattern of reasoning in OC 383:
The argument “I may be dreaming” is senseless (sinnlos) for this reason: If I
am dreaming, this remark is being dreamed as well—and indeed it is also
being dreamed that these words have any meaning (diese Worte eine
Bedeutung haben.)
In claiming that one who is sleeping is not “really talking or thinking,”
Wittgenstein is, in effect, contrasting the situation that a person is in who says “I
may be dreaming,” when normal background conditions are satisfied with someone
who is asleep. The contrast is made most explicit in Zettel 396. Here Wittgenstein’s
remarks, usually couched in the form of questions, can be seen to present a serious
of submerged arguments against the Dream Hypothesis. One simply has to rewrite
the passage in the least invasive way to present his comments as arguments. In order
to see what such a rewrite would look like, it is probably a good idea to present the
passage in its entirety. This is how the original reads:
What would it be like for someone to tell me with complete seriousness that he
(really) did not know whether he was dreaming or awake?—
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Is the following situation possible: Someone says “I believe I am now
dreaming”; he actually wakes up soon afterwards, remembers that utterance in
his dream and says: “So I was right!”—This narrative can surely only signify:
Someone dreamt that he had said he was dreaming.
Imagine an unconscious man (anaesthetized, say) were to say “I am
conscious”—should we say “He ought to know”?
And if someone talked in his sleep and said “I am asleep” should we say “He”s
quite right”?
Is someone speaking untruth if he says to me “I am not conscious”? (And
truth, if he says it while unconscious? And suppose a parrot says “I don’t
understand a word,” or a gramophone “I am only a machine”?) (Zettel, 396)
This passage opens with a sarcastic remark: “What would it be like for
someone to tell me with complete seriousness that he (really) did not know
whether he was dreaming or awake?” It is clear that the question is rhetorical.
The emphasis in Wittgenstein’s query is on four words: “with complete
seriousness” and “really”. If we reconstruct Wittgenstein’s thought here we find
the beginning of the argument that follows in the rest of the paragraph.
Wittgenstein thinks it quite absurd to suppose that a person speaking as he
stresses, “with complete seriousness” would really not know whether he was
dreaming or awake. The query is essentially a continuation of the idea that the
Cartesian supposition is senseless. Most persons of common sense would
wonder, if they attended a philosophical conference, at the lack of reality that
such epistemological speculation evinces. For most normal persons, the question
of whether they are asleep or awake never arises. They go to bed at night and
wake up in the morning and proceed to go about their normal activities. To
ask: “Are you sure you are really awake when you get up in the morning,”
would evoke disdain from them. For such persons, it would be an absurd
question. In this respect, Wittgenstein is a man of common sense, rejecting as
nonsense the philosophical tradition that takes the question seriously.
The remainder of entry 396 from Zettel falls into four parts, each of which
contains a question from Wittgenstein. Each question can be reconstituted as an
assertion and each assertion as part of an argument whose general structure I will
bring out below. I shall comment on the four parts in order. Wittgenstein asks:
1. Is the following situation possible: Someone says “I believe I am now
dreaming”; he actually wakes up soon afterwards, remembers that utterance in
his dream and says: “So I was right!” This narrative can surely only signify:
Someone dreamt that he had said he was dreaming
Wittgenstein’s comment here anticipates what he said in OC 383. There it will be
recalled he wrote:
The argument “I may be dreaming” is senseless for this reason: if I am
dreaming, this remark is being dreamed as well—and indeed it is also being
dreamed that these words have any meaning.
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As I mentioned above, Zettel consists of a series of clippings from writings he had
not used in other notebooks but which he felt might be useable in the future. The
latest datings we have of these clippings are August 1948, or about 3 years before
the last OC entries. There is thus a difference between the two fragments. In OC
Wittgenstein is much tougher; in Zettel 396, without abandoning his long standing
idea that radical scepticism is senseless, he does try to give a context in which the
remark: “I believe I am now dreaming,” would make sense. He says:
This narrative can surely only signify: someone dreamt that he had said he was
dreaming.”
The context refers to what might happen in a dream state. The sleeper is uttering
some words that he later remembers. But it is clear that Wittgenstein’s further remark
that the dreaming person upon awakening says “So I was right!” is a piece of
nonsense. Any comment made by a sleeping person cannot be taken literally. So
even this contextual concession does not affect his general thesis that if the person
said those words while asleep they would be senseless.
2. Let us now turn to his second comment. Again it begins with a question:
Imagine an unconscious man (anaesthetized say) were to say “I am
conscious”—should we say: “He ought to know.”?
It is clear that Wittgenstein regards the remark by one who is unconscious as nonsense.
The thrust of his question, when rewritten as an assertion, is not that the unconscious man
is saying something that is palpably untrue in saying that he is conscious, but that any
auditor should discount the remark as having significance. The idea that a person who is
unconscious can say anything significant rests upon the assumption that such a person
must be awake and must intend to make a positive or negative claim in order to say
anything meaningful. It is obvious that if one is unconscious one cannot intend anything.
The fact that one mutters a well-formed sentence must thus not be taken seriously. One
might describe the utterance as a case of babbling. The fact that the words can be
understood by an auditor, say a nurse or doctor, is irrelevant with respect to whether they
can be regarded as making a meaningful assertion.
3. Wittgenstein reinforces this contention with his next question. He is now
addressing the Dream Hypothesis directly:
And if someone talked in his sleep and said “I am asleep” should we say “He’s
quite right”?
The point he is making here is that “I am asleep,” if said while a person is actually
asleep and presumably dreaming, cannot be taken as significant. Wittgenstein’s
question: Should we say he’s quite right? is sardonic. As I have suggested above, the
question it expresses should be understood as making an affirmation, namely that to
say he’s “quite right,” is to be disregarded in those circumstances. It is nonsense to
think that a person who is asleep and hence not thinking or intending anything can
utter a significant statement. The import of such a rewriting is to cast serious doubt
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on whether Descartes’ depiction of his obsessive doubting makes sense. He says in
Meditation I, it will be recalled:
Let us suppose, then that we are dreaming, and that all these particulars—namely,
the opening of the eyes, the motion of the head, the forth-putting of the hands—are
merely illusions and even that we really possess neither an entire body nor hands.
It is interesting and informative to compare Wittgenstein’s approach to the Dream
Scenario with Moore’s. Moore was, of course, a distinguished philosopher in his
own right; but Wittgenstein’s understanding of the Dream Hypothesis exhibits a
profundity that well eclipses Moore’s. Unlike Moore who assumed that the Cartesian
hypothesis had to be met with a counter-proof, Wittgenstein is cutting it off at its
source by giving reasons why it does not make sense.
Moore realized when he was teaching at Cambridge and Wittgenstein was a
student there that Wittgenstein’s philosophical acumen was of a different order from
his or any other philosopher’s. He was correct in that evaluation. Wittgenstein was a
genius and Moore an above average college professor with an exceptional gift for
making subtle linguistic distinctions. To see how Moore rated himself in comparison
to Wittgenstein we should reread his autobiography. In it, he describes their
profoundly differing understandings of the peculiar nature of philosophical puzzles:
In 1912 I became acquainted with Wittgenstein. During the first year in which
he was at Cambridge he attended my lectures on Psychology; but it was only
during the next 2 years that I got to know him at all well. When I did get to
know him, I soon came to feel that he was much cleverer at philosophy than I
was, and not only cleverer, but also much more profound, and with a better
insight into the sort of inquiry which was really important and best worth
pursuing, and into the best method of pursuing such inquiries. I did not see him
again, after 1914, until he returned to Cambridge in 1929; but when his
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus came out, I read it again and again, trying to
learn from it. It is a book which I admired and do admire extremely. There is,
of course, a great deal in it which I was not able to understand; but many
things I thought I did understand, and found them very enlightening. When he
came back to Cambridge in 1929 I attended his lectures for several years in
succession, always with admiration4. How far he has influenced positively
anything that I have written, I cannot tell; but he certainly has had the effect of
making me very distrustful about many things which, but for him, I should
have been inclined to assert positively. He has made me think that what is
4 Despite the seriousness, and even solemnity, of much of Moore’s writing, he had a robust and somewhat
sly sense of humor. Here are two examples: When Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge, he enrolled as a
PhD student, and submitted the Tractatus, which had been published seven years earlier, as his doctoral
dissertation. Moore and Russell agreed to serve as examiners on his committee. According to Hermine
Wittgenstein, Ludwig’s sister, the exam seems to have been something of a farce. She says: “It consisted
of the professors asking Ludwig to explain passages from his book.” As one might have predicted,
Wittgenstein passed the exam with flying colors. At its conclusion, Moore wrote to the Cambridge
authorities: ‘It is my personal opinion that Mr. Wittgenstein’s thesis is a work of genius; but, be that as it
may, it is certainly well up to the standard required for the Cambridge degree of Doctor of Philosophy’.
Now a second example. In one of his essays, he mentions that the Duke of Bedford dreamed that he was
speaking before the House of Lords and when the Duke woke up, he was.
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required for the solution of philosophical problems which baffle me, is a
method quite different from any which I have ever used—a method which he
himself uses successfully, but which I have never been able to understand
clearly enough to use it myself. I’m glad to think that he is my successor in the
Professorship at Cambridge. (Moore 1968, 33)
Moore’s autobiography was published in 1942, not long after his career as a
teacher at Cambridge had ended. He is characteristically frank and honest in
acknowledging that Wittgenstein used a method for dealing with philosophical
problems that he (Moore) was never able to understand clearly enough to use
himself. Wittgenstein’s treatment of the Dream Hypothesis is a good example of
their differing approaches to such worries. Moore was, as I have said, a distinguished
thinker by any standard. If a list of great British philosophers from Hobbes through
Russell, were to be drawn up, Moore would obviously rank very high in that
selection. But as our description of Wittgenstein’s assessment of The Dream
Hypothesis shows, Moore was no Wittgenstein.
The preceding quotations from Zettel illustrate the sort of moves that Wittgenstein
makes against Moore’s “Proof of an External World.” The passages I have quoted
contain implicit arguments that not only undermine Moore’s assumption that “I may
be dreaming,” is sensible but that show that the Cartesian argument is also senseless.
The implication to be drawn from Wittgenstein’s implicit arguments is a powerful
criticism of any attempt, such as Moore tries to develop, to provide a counter-
argument to scepticism. If the sceptic’s position cannot be coherently stated, there is
nothing that needs to be refuted. And indeed to offer a so-called “proof” by way of
such a refutation is itself incoherent, since it mistakenly assumes that the Dream
Hypothesis is a sensible conjecture. This is a mistake that Wittgenstein never made.
The passage from Zettel concludes with another question that can and should be
rewritten as an affirmation. It says:
4. Is someone speaking untruth if he says to me “I am not conscious,” (And truth,
if he says it while unconscious)? And suppose a parrot says “I don’t understand
a word,” or a gramophone “I am only a machine.” (Zettel, 396).
Wittgenstein’s examples here are particularly powerful. They make the point that
a person who is unconscious is not intending to say anything and that accordingly no
questions of truth or falsity arise. Wittgenstein’s questions about what a person
would say if unconscious have to be reconstituted as assertions if their full power is
to be felt. All of these reworked assertions form part of a general argument that
Wittgenstein never states in any of his later writings, but which I think bring out the
force of his sarcastic questions. That argument—and I emphasize again that it cannot
be found in any of the texts we now have—might be formulated as follows:
Insofar as X, a radical sceptic such as Descartes, wishes to make a certain kind of
conceptual point, the utterance that X uses to make it must be a genuine statement.
Suppose X utters the sentence, “I may be dreaming.” If X is in fact asleep and
dreaming, the requirement of genuine statement-making is violated. For if X is in
fact asleep and dreaming, his remark occurs as part of his dream. In that case, X is
not really intending to make a claim about his present state of mind (or as
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Wittgenstein puts it, is not talking or thinking) and therefore his utterance is not a
genuine assertion. It is not a genuine assertion because the background conditions
for statement-making have not been satisfied. These conditions are that X be
awake, be fully aware of what his words mean, and intend them to make an
assertion. But if X is asleep, these criteria remain unfulfilled. Therefore, X’s words
are senseless when uttered in those circumstances; and because that is so, X’s
attempt to state, in the Dream Hypothesis, a radical form of scepticism lacks
conceptual force. This does not mean that the same words, uttered in different
circumstances, may not have an application. They can, but they cannot be used,
with sense, by a person who is fully awake, to claim that he might at that very
moment be asleep and dreaming.
This is a new specimen of reasoning. It shows the originality of Wittgenstein’s
thinking about an attitude that has bedeviled philosophy from its earliest beginnings
to the present, and that many thinkers, convinced that we have both knowledge and
certainty about the world, have tried to rebut. Wittgenstein’s genius consisted, at
least in part, in looking at this form of incessant doubt from a genuinely different
standpoint. He is unquestionably right that such forms of radical scepticism cannot
even be coherently formulated, and that any attempt to do so is palpable nonsense.
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